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Abstract 
 
On the evidence of national surveys conducted between 2000 and 2006, there is a 
declining sense of European self-identity in the three Slavic post-Soviet republics of 
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Attitudes towards the European Union and the 
possibility of membership are broadly supportive, but with a substantial proportion 
who find it difficult to express a view, and substantial proportions are poorly informed 
in comparison with the general public in EU member or prospective member 
countries. Those who are better informed are more likely to favour EU membership 
and vice versa. Generally, socioeconomic characteristics (except for age and region) 
are relatively poor predictors of support for EU membership as compared with 
attitudinal variables. But ‘Europeanness’ should not be seen as a given, and much will 
depend on whether EU member countries emphasize what is common to east and west 
or establish ‘new dividing lines’ in place of those of the cold war. 
 
Introduction 
 
It used to be easy to define ‘Europe’. It was bounded by seas and a mountain range. 
Its peoples spoke Indo-European languages, shared a variety of Christian religions, 
and transacted their business within a framework that had been established by Roman 
law. Its origins lay in Christendom, in the Roman Empire and in the Holy Roman 
Empire that succeeded it and nominally survived until the early nineteenth century. It 
was divided for most of the century that followed by ideology; but as the iron curtain 
came down at the end of the 1980s, the political and military alliances of the West 
began to extend eastwards in a series of enlargements that by 2007 was expected to 
have taken them as far as the Black Sea. Opinion was sharply divided about whether 
further enlargement was appropriate. For some, there was simply too great a cultural 
distance between the existing members and states that might 
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join the union at some point in the future, particularly Turkey. But others still 
favoured a union that was less exclusively Christian, and which might exercise a 
beneficent influence on the development of democratic norms in countries in which 
they were less firmly rooted. 
 A wider Europe raised some particularly complex issues in relation to the countries 
of the former Soviet Union. The Baltics were a special case: they had been 
incorporated during the Second World War in an action that was recognized to have 
no basis in international law and they resumed their independence in September 1991 
while the USSR was still formally in existence; they became members of the EU and 
of NATO without undue controversy in 2004; and they were very small. But the other 
former Soviet republics presented more serious difficulties. They had been part of the 
Russian, rather than the Habsburg Empire. They were predominantly part of eastern, 
rather than western Christianity. They spoke Slavic, rather than Romance or 
Germanic languages. And they had experienced two generations of Soviet rule, which 
left behind a number of distinctive legacies. Not surprisingly, the Western alliances 
preferred to suggest co-operation rather than membership: in NATO’s case, the 
Partnership for Peace, launched in 1994, of which Russia, Belarus and Ukraine all 
became members; in the EU’s case, a ‘Neighbourhood Policy’, approved in 2004, and 
which incorporated a series of North African and other countries that were likely to 
constitute the Union’s immediate proximity for some time to come, perhaps for ever 
(Commission, 2004; for a discussion see Smith, 2005). 
 An abundant literature has focused on virtually every aspect of EU relations with its 
east European neighbours (see for instance Johnson and Robinson, 2005; Antonenko 
and Pinnick, 2005; Jacoby, 2005; Timmins and Gower, 2007). Rather less attention 
has been paid to the development of relations in the other direction, between the 
former Soviet republics and ‘Europe’, including not only the development of official 
policy but also the patterns of public attitudes that underpin those relations, and taking 
account of the literature of these countries themselves (such as Borko and Danilov, 
2005; Butorina and Borko, 2006; Glukharev, 2006). Do Russians, Belarusians and 
Ukrainians, for instance, think of themselves as ‘Europeans’ and what place does 
‘Europe’ occupy within their repertoire of loyalties and identities? What view do they 
take of the European Union itself and what support do they give to the idea of 
membership, at least as a hypothetical possibility? Are those views associated (so that 
self-identifying ‘Europeans’, for instance, support EU membership more than others)? 
And do ‘Europeans’, however defined, have characteristic views on other issues of 
public policy, such as the planned economy or forms of government? 
 In what follows we focus more closely on this complex of issues, drawing on a 
series of national representative surveys in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine conducted at 
several points in time between 2000 and 2006 (an appendix provides further 
details).We look first of all at some of the issues that arise in considering the 
‘Europeanness’ of the three Slavic republics, and then examine the distribution of a 
self-assigned European identity and of views of the European Union across time and 
across the three countries. We move on to consider the dimensions of ‘Europeanness’, 
including knowledge and the social attributes of support for a hypothetical EU 
membership. Finally, we examine the sources of support for a hypothetical EU 
membership, taking account of regional differences as well as of other predictors; and 
in a conclusion, suggest some of the larger implications of our findings. We seek 
throughout to place our findings in a broader comparative context, and to draw on 
earlier research that allows us to incorporate a strong diachronic dimension. 
 
I. Identifying ‘Europe’ 
 
Just as the geographical boundaries of ‘Europe’ have shifted over time (see for 
instance Hay, 1957; Wolff, 1994; Pagden, 2002), so too there have been shifts in the 
boundaries of ‘Europe in the mind’ – the complex of values and shared experience 
that defines a European identity. Much of this work has centred on the European 
Union and the populations of its Member States, often using the data conveniently 
provided by the Eurobarometer (see for instance Duchesne and Frognier, 1995; 
Herrmann et al., 2004; Buonanno and Deakin, 2004; Bruter, 2005). But a European 
identity is not the same as an identification with the institutions of the European 
Union, which is the obvious preoccupation of the Eurobarometer, and even after the 
incorporation of Bulgaria and Romania, EU Member States account for less than half 
(44 per cent) of the territory and not much more than two-thirds (68 per cent) of the 
population of Europe as conventionally defined. Our primary focus in this article is on 
the three Slavic states in the eastern part of the continent that are largely or entirely 
‘European’ in their location and cultural attributes, but which are not expected to join 
the European Union in the near future, if at all. 
 If ambiguity marks the outer limits of this ‘European’ cultural space, the same is 
true of the Slavic republics that now constitute the EU’s new ‘neighbourhood’ (see for 
instance Neumann, 1996, 1999). Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians share their 
Christianity with the rest of geographical Europe. They speak a language that is part 
of the Indo-European family. They have been part of the European state system since 
at least the seventeenth century and were allies of the West in two world wars. Their 
students completed their education at European universities; their nobility, before the 
revolution, spent their summers in Biarritz, Nice and Baden-Baden, and spoke French 
more readily than Russian. Their royal houses were interrelated, often through a 
common German ancestry; Nicholas II of Russia even looked like his English cousin, 
George V. The Bolsheviks themselves had been a part of the Second International 
before the war, they modelled their new state on the Paris Commune and took their 
Marxism from Germany. In turn, they expected to become a member of a wider union 
of socialist republics, first in Europe and then internationally, as the workers of the 
world discovered their essential unity. 
 But there were differences, of both an ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ kind. The Slavic 
peoples belonged to a distinct sub-group within the Indo-European family of 
languages, with a different alphabet. They belonged to eastern, rather than western 
Christianity. Their historical experience had not been shaped by Roman law and 
feudalism, and then by the Renaissance and Reformation, but by a Mongol yoke that 
had lasted two hundred years. Their nobility was an extension of state power, not a 
check upon it. Their business community was closely regulated by government, which 
had itself a substantial role as owner and manager. Their church was governed by a 
Holy Synod, with a membership selected by the Tsar. And their courts were less 
independent; trial by jury came later than in Western Europe, and could in any case be 
set aside in political cases. An elected parliament came later still, after the 
revolutionary upheaval of 1905; even so it had no direct control over the formation of 
government, or over two-thirds of state expenditure. Later again, all three republics 
were a part of the Soviet system from its inception. 
 There were other divisions that were internal to each of the East European societies. 
Russia, most obviously, stretched across the globe, with most of its population in 
geographical Europe but most of its territory outside it. Belarus was predominantly 
Orthodox, but with a substantial Catholic and – historically – Jewish minority. It was 
part of Kievan Rus, but was later absorbed within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 
which merged with Poland in the sixteenth century; later still, after the partitions, it 
moved into the Russian Empire (the importance of these origins is emphasized in 
Snyder, 2003). Ukraine was also Orthodox, but with a substantial [Greek] Catholic, 
sometimes called Uniate, minority, and very marked differences between a Russified, 
industrial east and a rural, Catholic west of which a part had been within the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and had come under Soviet rule as late as 1939. These different 
historical experiences in turn became alternative narratives that had no very obvious 
relationship to the ‘facts’, but which helped to ground and legitimate the claims of a 
diversity of different political communities (see for instance Wilson, 2000); the two 
most important of these communities confronted each other directly in the presidential 
and parliamentary elections of 2004–07. 
 Huntington’s celebrated thesis about the ‘clash of civilizations’ was mainly 
concerned with Christianity and Islam, but it also differentiated between the West and 
a Slavic-Orthodox civilization centred on Russia. The West, he argued, had a number 
of features that distinguished it, including individualism, the rule of law, a market 
economy and the separation of church and state. Orthodox civilization, by contrast, 
was based on a different tradition in which church and state were closely associated, 
and it had experienced long periods of foreign domination. Differences of this kind, 
Huntington suggested, were ‘far more fundamental than differences among political 
ideologies and political regimes’, and they marked out a society that had ‘little 
resemblance to those developed in western Europe under the influence of very 
different forces’. Russia fell entirely within Huntington’s Orthodox civilization, but it 
was a ‘torn society’, spread across two continents and uncertain if it was European or 
Asian; Belarus and Ukraine were much more obviously divided, with their western 
regions a part of western Christianity and their eastern regions much closer to the 
world of Orthodoxy and Islam (Huntington, 1993, pp. 29–31, 43–4; 1996, pp. 139–40, 
159). 
 Differences of this kind had their expression in a continuing internal debate about 
whether societies of this kind were essentially European or a distinct civilization of 
their own. In Russia, this took the form of a confrontation between ‘westernizers’, 
keen for Russia to adopt more of the institutions and practices of its European 
neighbours, and ‘Slavophils’, who took a disparaging view of the immorality, 
commercialism and division of the West and believed that Russians and the other 
Slavic peoples had a different and altogether superior destiny (the development of 
these views is traced in Duncan, 2000). It was differences of this kind that had 
separated Mensheviks from Bolsheviks before the Russian revolution, and later 
Trotsky and more internationally oriented Marxists from Stalin and the nativist 
tradition; later on they separated Western-oriented liberals such as Russia’s first 
foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, from those who took a more sceptical view of the 
West’s intentions, including many who were prominent in communist, nationalist and 
Orthodox circles. ‘Westernizers’, in their modern form, were likely to favour a closer 
association with ‘Europe’ and its institutions, and ideally EU membership; 
‘Slavophils’ were more likely to lean towards central Asia, India and China, and were 
less ready to accept the West’s globalizing mission at face value. 
 Clearly, no single mode of inquiry is likely to do justice to the complexity of 
characteristics that we might choose to identify as ‘European’. As Cederman (2001, p. 
1) has noted, Europe ‘belongs to the most elusive and contested entities in today’s 
international system’; indeed as Strath (2002) has argued, although there has been a 
high degree of agreement about the concept of a European identity, there has been 
such deep disagreement about its content and meaning that its analytical utility may 
be questioned. In other work, we have ourselves explored the contribution that can be 
made by qualitative methods, particularly focus groups, as a means of examining the 
‘meaning’ of identities for participants themselves, and ‘ “why” [they] think or feel 
the way they do’ (Litosseliti, 2003, p. 18; see for instance Allison et al., 2005, 2006). 
In this article we place ourselves within the rather different quantitative tradition that 
is reflected in the Eurobarometer and the other survey-based exercises that have been 
carried out on a pan-European basis over the post-communist period (see Slomczyski 
and Tomescu-Dubrow, 2006, for a review); it is only methods of this kind that can 
establish the distribution of attitudes across national populations, between national 
populations and over time, although they may not always be the most appropriate 
for other purposes. 
 
II. Perceptions of ‘Europe’ 
 
We asked, first of all, if our respondents in the three countries thought of themselves 
as ‘Europeans’ and to what extent. Our results are set out in Table 1; several 
conclusions emerge. First of all, there has been a general tendency for European self-
identity to decline: most obviously in Russia, more irregularly in Belarus and Ukraine. 
About half of our Russian and Belarusian respondents in 2000 thought they were at 
least to some extent ‘European’, and more than a third of our Ukrainians thought the 
same; five or six years later the proportions were down to a quarter in Russia and 
Ukraine, although they were rather higher in Belarus. Moreover, the largest 
movement of opinion had been towards those who felt they were ‘not at all’ 
European, who represented at least half of all of our Russian and Ukrainian 
respondents in 2005–06 (once again, fewer Belarusians than in the other two countries 
were likely to take this view). In Russia, in 2000, the largest single group had felt at 
least ‘to some extent’ European; by 2005–06, in Russia and Ukraine, the largest single 
groups were those who felt ‘not at all’ European, and even in Belarus a majority were 
more likely to feel ‘not at all’ or ‘seldom’ European than to take the opposite view. 
 
Table 1: European Identity, 2000-06 
 
Russia Belarus Ukraine 
2000 2004 2005 2000 2004 2006 2000 2004 2006 
To a 
significant 
extent 
18 9 7 16 9 11 8 6 6 
To some 
extent 
34 21 18 34 25 29 26 20 22 
Seldom 28 13 14 38 17 30 57 13 16 
Not at all 19 47 54  37 24  49 50 
(Ns) (1940) (2000) (2000) (1090) (1599) (1000) (1590) (2000) (1600) 
Source: Authors’ surveys (see appendix). Question wording was ‘Do you think of yourself as a 
European?’ In 2000 the Belarusian and Ukrainian responses were ‘often’, ‘sometimes’ or ‘never’. 
Figures show rounded percentages; don’t knows and no answers account for residuals.  
 
Identities, as we have noted, are multiple and polyvalent, not ‘givens’ that are 
located outside time and space and no single question is likely to yield a complete and 
unambiguous set of responses. Accordingly, in later surveys we asked a related set of 
questions using a wording modelled on the Eurobarometer, which allowed for a first 
and second choice within a wider spectrum of identities, and which provided 
responses that could in principle be compared across the entire continent. Our results 
are set out in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: European vs Other Self-Identities, 2000–06 
Russia Belarus Ukraine 
2004 2005 2004 2006 2004 2006 
European 10 8 16 20 10 12 
Eurasian 6 3 2 3 2 2 
Soviet 
citizen 
13 13 10 12 11 9 
Citizen of 
my country 
73 76 72 85 69 68 
Citizen of 
my region 
32 29 18 25 27 33 
From my 
settlement 
66 69 65 50 69 64 
(Ns) (2000) (2000) (1599) (1000) (2000) (1600) 
Source: Authors’ surveys (see appendix). Question wording was ‘Which of the following do you think 
of yourself to be first of all? And secondly?’ Figures show all who gave a corresponding response as 
their first or second choice, in rounded percentages; don’t knows and no answers account for residuals. 
 
Again, the main conclusions are clear. Overwhelmingly, in each country, our 
respondents felt their first identity was as citizen of that country. Almost to the same 
extent, they identified themselves as citizens of their local area or settlement; regional 
identities were also popular. But relatively few thought of their identity as a European 
one, in the first, or even in the second place. Belarusians, who (as we have seen) were 
more likely to think of themselves as ‘Europeans’, were also the most likely to 
identify themselves with a European identity. But the numbers in every case were 
relatively low; in Russia, fewer chose a ‘European’ than a ‘Soviet’ identity a decade 
and a half after the demise of the USSR. 
 Across the countries of the European Union, levels of identification with ‘Europe’ 
are considerably higher. The Eurobarometer routinely asks if respondents think of 
themselves as nationals of their own country, or as Europeans, or as nationals of their 
own country and also Europeans. According to the most recent exercise, which was 
fielded in late 2005, 55 per cent thought they had at least a partly European identity, 
and rather fewer (42 per cent) thought they had only a national identity 
(Eurobarometer, 2006, p. 44). Although not precisely comparable, our own figures 
suggest a primary or secondary European identity that is nowhere more than 20 per 
cent (in Belarus), as against an identity that is at least partly European among the EU 
Member States that is nowhere less than 32 per cent (in the UK) and as high as 72 per 
cent (in Luxembourg). In Bulgaria and Romania, which at the time of the survey had 
still to join the EU, levels of self-reported European identity were 47 and 59 per cent 
respectively; even in Turkey, an almost entirely Asian country with no immediate 
prospect of membership, a substantial 29 per cent thought of themselves as at least 
partly European – more than twice as many as in Ukraine, a country whose European 
geographical location and cultural affinity has never been in question. 
What, then, about attitudes towards the European Union itself? Whether or not our 
respondents felt ‘European’, how did they evaluate the organization within which 
most of the states in the western part of the continent were economically and 
politically associated? We set out our results in Table 3. Across the three countries, 
positive attitudes predominated: by four or five to one, respondents in every case had 
a ‘positive’ or ‘very positive’ image of the European Union, rather than a ‘negative’ 
or ‘very negative’ one. But still more striking is the proportion who were unwilling to 
express an opinion. In almost every case, they were the largest or equal-largest group 
of respondents; in every case, they accounted for at least 30 per cent of the total. And 
although Russians were moving towards a more favourable view of the EU, there was 
little sign of a movement in the same direction in Belarus and Ukraine (if anything, 
the opposite). On this evidence, not simply are there relatively low levels of European 
self-identity in the three Slavic republics that make up the largest part of post-Soviet 
Europe, there are also relatively large proportions who are not prepared to express an 
opinion one way or the other about the European Union, although those who do have 
an opinion are more likely to be positive than negative. 
 We also asked about membership – even in the case of Yushchenko’s Ukraine, not 
an immediate or medium-term prospect, although the agreement to form a new 
government of August 2006 reaffirmed the country’s long-term Euro-Atlantic 
aspirations (Financial Times, 5 August 2006, p. 6). We set out our results in Table 4. 
Again, positive opinions predominated across all three countries, though not quite so 
decisively: in Russia by about three to one, in Belarus by about two to one, and by 
rather less in Ukraine although the principle of membership was still supported by a 
clear plurality. Russians, over time, were becoming more enthusiastic, Belarusians 
and Ukrainians somewhat less so. As before, a substantial proportion in each of the 
three countries had no opinion. The clearest conclusion of all was perhaps that there 
was a general stability in attitudes towards EU membership: across the three countries 
and across a number of years there was substantial support for membership, but also a 
substantial proportion who found it difficult to make up their mind. 
Table 3: Assessments of the European Union, 2000-06 
Russia Belarus Ukraine 
2006 2004 2005 2000 2004 2006 2000 2004 2006 
Very positive 5 9 9 11 9 11 15 10 9 
Rather positive 16 35 40 36 35 36 35 38 38 
Rather negative 7 6 8 9 6 10 5 8 14 
Very negative 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 8 
No view 69 46 40 39 36 40 35 40 31 
(Ns) (1940) (2000) (2000) (1090) (1599) (1000) (1590) (2000) (1600) 
Source: Authors’ surveys (see appendix). Question wording was “What is your attitude towards the 
aims and activities of the European Union?” Figures show rounded percentages; no answers account 
for residuals.  
Table 4: Attitudes towards EU Membership, 2000-06 
Russia Belarus Ukraine 
2000 2004 2005 2000 2004 2006 2000 2004 2006 
Strongly in favour 12 18 19 23 25 16 23 19 16 
Somewhat in 
favour 
35 34 37 31 34 30 34 35 30 
Somewhat against 9 9 12 11 8 18 7 11 18 
Strongly against 2 6 7 6 3 8 4 6 17 
No view 37 33 25 30 28 28 26 29 19 
(Ns) (1940) (2000) (2000) (1090) (1599) (1000) (1590) (2000) (1600) 
Source: Authors’ surveys (see appendix). Question wording was ‘If country were to join the European 
Union, would you be…?’ Figures show rounded percentages; no answers account for residuals.  
 
III. The Dimensions of ‘Europeanness’ 
 
Attitudes towards the European Union, as we have seen, are broadly positive across 
our three countries, but with a substantial and enduring proportion who are reluctant 
to express an opinion. The same is true of attitudes towards the hypothetical 
possibility of membership. Uncertainty in such matters need hardly surprise us: none 
of the three Slavic republics is being considered for admission and they are 
geographically remote from the EU’s original member nations, although not from the 
ten new Member States that joined in 2004. But it is also likely that high levels of 
uncertainty are associated with modest levels of knowledge of the EU and of the 
working of its institutions, not just in ‘absolute’ terms but as compared with levels of 
knowledge in the original Member States and those that became members in 2004; 
and that this is a reciprocal relationship in which the better informed are more likely 
to be certain in their views (and more positive), and those who are more certain in 
their views and more positive are likely to be better informed. 
 How many, for a start, could identify the European Union from a list of four 
international organizations, one of them entirely fictitious?Aplurality in every case 
identified it as an ‘economic and political association of the countries of western 
Europe’, which we regarded as the correct answer. But substantial numbers in Russia 
and Ukraine identified it as ‘an association of European countries including our 
country’, with the Council of Europe presumably in mind, and many others chose 
either ‘a military association of the countries of western Europe and North America’ 
(NATO) or ‘the European section of the United Nations’ (which does not exist). 
Between a quarter and a third, the second largest group in every case, had no idea 
(Table 5).We also asked about the location of the EU headquarters, with Brussels as 
one of the five options available; nowhere did as many as a half identify Brussels 
correctly, although a fifth would have done so randomly. About a third of our 
Belarusian and Ukrainian respondents answered both questions correctly, but fewer 
Russians. 
 As we had hypothesized, those who were better informed were more likely to 
express a definite opinion about the EU and the prospect of membership, 
 
Table 5: Knowledge of ‘Europe’, 2000–06 
Russia Belarus Ukraine 
2000 2004 2005 2000 2004 2006 2000 2004 2006 
What is the EU?  
An association of European 
countries, including our own 
- 17 16 - 9 6 - 14 13 
A military alliance of W. Europe 
and N. America 
 6 8 - 8 4 - 5 9 
A political and economic alliance 
of W. Europe 
- 40 39 - 48 53 - 42 51 
The European section of UN - 6 8 - 5 5 - 6 4 
Don’t know/No answer - 32 29 - 30 32 - 34 23 
Where is the EU HQ?  
Brussels 31 34 39 34 49 49 27 36 48 
Don’t know 60 40 50 56 42 42 68 56 37 
Both correct - 18 22 - 31 34 - 21 30 
One correct - 38 35 - 35 33 - 36 39 
Neither correct - 44 43 - 34 33 - 43 31 
(Ns) 1940 2000 2000 1090 1599 1000 1590 2000 1600 
Source: Authors’ surveys (see appendix). Question wordings were ‘Which of the following is the most 
accurate characterisation of the European Union?’ (this question was not asked in 2000); and ‘As you 
probably know, 25 states of Western Europe have united in the European Union. Do you know in 
which city the headquarters of the European Union is located?’. Figures show rounded percentages; in 
the second case no answers account for residuals. 
 
and to be more positive than their counterparts; and those who were more positive 
were themselves likely to be better informed. For instance, in Russia, 39 per cent were 
able to identify the European Union as an organization, but 49 per cent of those who 
felt ‘to a significant degree’ European were able to do so, and 46 per cent of those 
who ‘strongly approved’ of membership. In Belarus, 53 per cent identified the EU 
correctly, but 66 per cent of those who strongly supported membership; conversely, 
17 per cent of the entire sample strongly supported membership, but 21 per cent of 
those who identified the EU correctly. There were similar results in Ukraine, where 
51 per cent identified the EU correctly but 60 per cent of those who ‘strongly 
supported’ membership were able to do so. Not surprisingly those who identified the 
EU correctly were also more likely to identify the city that is its administrative 
headquarters and vice versa. The better informed, in each of the three countries, the 
more likely to support membership; and the more likely to support membership, the 
better informed. 
 We have no wish to exaggerate the command of detail that is possessed by ordinary 
Europeans about the complex framework of which their states are members; nor 
would it be appropriate to ask exactly the same questions as we put to our respondents 
in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, none of which is a member country. Nonetheless, a 
comparison with the kinds of responses obtained by the Eurobarometer suggests a 
considerable East–West gap in understanding. Across the EU itself, 58 per cent were 
aware that the Union did not ‘consist of twelve Member States’. A very similar 59 per 
cent were aware that the President of the EU Commission is not ‘directly elected by 
the citizens of the European Union’, and a comparable 58 per cent that the European 
Parliament is ‘directly elected by the citizens of the European Union’. In Russia, 
Belarus and Ukraine, as we have seen, not even half of our respondents could identify 
the EU in the most general terms. In the EU member countries, similarly, as many as 
94 per cent had seen the EU flag and 95 per cent could identify it correctly 
(Eurobarometer, 2005, pp. 40–6, 92–3); this compared for instance with Russia, in 
which not much more than a third of our respondents were able to pick out Brussels as 
the EU headquarters, although Belarusians and Ukrainians were better informed. 
 Apart from being better informed, did supporters of EU membership have other 
characteristics that set them apart from their counterparts? Were they likely to be 
younger or older, richer or poorer, or in any way distinctive in their attitudes towards 
the political and economic system? We set out the evidence in Table 6. The attributes 
of EU supporters, it emerged, were generally very similar across the three countries. 
Those who favoured membership, for instance, were more likely to be male than 
female; they tended to be younger than the population as a whole; and they were 
likely to have higher levels of education, which was obviously consistent with their 
better levels of knowledge. In Russia and Ukraine, they were also more likely to have 
higher (self-assessed) incomes. Many of these patterns, however, were asymmetric. 
Thus, in all three countries males were not only more likely to support EU 
membership, but also more likely to oppose it. The same was true of Belarusian 
respondents with a higher education and of urban as compared with rural residents. 
Similarly, the effects of higher incomes were strong in Russia and Ukraine, but not in 
Belarus. 
 There were stronger and more predictable associations with a series of policy 
positions, some of which are part of the Copenhagen conditions that set out the 
prerequisites for EU membership. In every case, Belarusians, Russians and 
Ukrainians who supported membership were also more likely to favour Western-style 
democracy and to oppose the unreformed Soviet system. EU supporters were more 
likely to support a market economy than a planned economy of the Soviet type. They 
were more likely to ‘feel European’ and very much more likely to favour NATO 
membership. But were these spurious associations, or did they remain valid when we 
controlled for other variables? We examine the direct effects of EU membership 
support in the next section of the article, holding other variables constant, and 
introduce a regional element that allows us to disaggregate our results across the 
larger subnational components of three politically diverse societies. 
 
Table 6: Support for EU Membership by Socioeconomic Characteristics and Policy 
Preferences, 2004 
 
Belarus Russia Ukraine 
For Agst For Agst For Agst 
Socioecon. characteristics  
Male 65 13 55 18 60 19 
Female 54 10 49 12 50 15 
Under 30 years 69 8 59 13 68 11 
60 or older 42 13 38 15 40 18 
Urban 63 12 53 16 56 17 
Rural 52 8 50 11 50 16 
Primary education 32 10 35 14 32 16 
Higher education 67 14 69 16 70 14 
Low income 61 10 46 16 45 20 
High income 59 14 61 14 66 16 
Political system preferences  
Favour Western democracy 81 7 64 12 77 9 
Favours Soviet system before perestroika 37 21 41 17 32 26 
Economic system preferences  
Favours a market economy 71 8 59 15 64 14 
Favours a Soviet-type economy 44 17 47 15 46 21 
Foreign policy preferences  
Feels European 79 8 66 11 79 9 
Doesn’t fell European 56 13 49 17 48 22 
Supports NATO membership 87 5 74 9 83 7 
Opposes NATO membership 54 22 54 25 40 34 
Total 59 11 52 15 54 17 
Source: Authors’ surveys (see appendix). Row percentages. Question wording as in Table 4. ‘No view’ 
and ‘No answer’ account for residuals. Cells highlighted in bold show a statistically significant 
association between the two variables, judged by the values of adjusted residuals (see Miller et al., 
2002, pp. 132–3). 
 
IV. Predicting Support for EU Membership 
 
Earlier studies have suggested that in the post-communist region younger age and 
higher education – in particular – are closely associated with a membership 
perspective (Haerpfer, 2002, pp. 124–5, 127–8; Caplanova et al., 2004, p. 279, 
education; Tucker et al., 2002, p. 561, age, but not education). The results of our own 
cross-tabulations in Table 6 also suggested that a higher level of education, younger 
age and European self-perception would all be likely to exert a positive and 
statistically significant effect on support for EU membership. And we expected 
regional differences to play a significant part in explaining support for EU 
membership, with those in the western part of the country (for instance) more pro-
European than those in the east, and more likely to favour membership. Furthermore, 
we expected regional differences to be a stronger predictor of support for EU 
membership in Ukraine, with its strongly self-conscious regionalism, and less so in 
Belarus and Russia (which have a greater degree of cultural homogeneity). In Russia 
our distinction was between its European residents, west of the Urals and the 
remainder. Finally, we expected that better knowledge of the EU and a higher level of 
identification with ‘Europe’ would have a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with the level of support for prospective membership with effects that 
were likely to be particularly marked in Belarus, given that Belarusians were better 
informed than other respondents and more likely to think of themselves as Europeans. 
 We consider this complex of factors in Table 7, in which we examine the extent to 
which the variables we have identified help to explain support for EU membership, 
with other factors held constant. We exclude from our analysis such variables as 
support for a Western-style political system, support for a market economy and for 
NATO membership, given that the relationship between these variables and support 
for EU membership is bidirectional.1 Multinominal logistic regression is used in all 
three cases to predict support for EU membership. 
 
Table 7: Predicting Support for EU Membership 
 
Parameter estimates 
Belarus Russia Ukraine 
Socioeconomic characteristics  
Gender (male) -0.229 (0.173) -0.359** (.0.139) -0.222 (0.136) 
Age    
 30–59 years old -0.526* (0.228) -0.167 (0.172) -0.527* (0.206) 
 Over 60 -0.939** (0.277) -0.456** (0.222) -0.780** (0.229) 
Education    
 Secondary 0.248 (0.321) 0.349 (0.194) 0.052  (0.218) 
 Higher -0.147 (0.346) 0.482* (0.222) 0.387 (0.259) 
Region    
 South - - 0.285 (0.182) 
 Left Bank - - 0.607* (0.272) 
 Right Bank - - 0.246 (0.185) 
 Centre 0.604** (0.204) - -
West/Europea 0.538* (0.215) 0.003 (0.150) 10.172** (0.233) 
City resident -0.381 (0.218) -0.433* (0.173) -0.029 (0.153) 
Income    
 Average -0.190 (0.182) 0.107 (0.483) 0.539** (0.139) 
 High -0.307 (0.365) 0.204 (0.670) 0.281 (0.352) 
Other determinants  
Knowledge of EU    
 One answer correct 0.437* (0.215) 0.322* (0.163) 0.005 (0.156) 
 Both answers correct 0.703** (0.229) -0.039 (0.188) 0.069 (0.185) 
European self-identity    
 Feel European 0.776** (0.197) 0.800** (0.163) 10.187** (0.178) 
 Neither -0.308 (0.319) 0.110 (294) 0.648 (0.281) 
Constant 10.61** (0.303) 10.21** (0.303) 0.690* (0.333) 
 
1A bidirectional relationship implies that, for instance, as much support for EU membership can be 
predicted by support for a market economy as vice versa. This problem can empirically be resolved by 
a two-stage least-squares methodology incorporating the use of instrumental variables (for a discussion 
of the relevant tests see Gujarati, 1995). The absence of appropriate instrumental variables that could 
be highly correlated with each of the endogenous regressors but uncorrelated with support for EU 
membership, however, makes it difficult to carry out an analysis of this kind. 
 
Adj. R-sq.    
 Cox & Snell 0.28 0.21 0.27 
 Nagelkerke 0.33 0.24 0.31 
Ns 1561 1956 1981 
Source: as Table 1 (2004 surveys). 
Notes: * statistically significant at p< R0.05, ** p <0.01, both two-tailed. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses. 
a: ‘West’ is used for Belarus and Ukraine; ‘Europe’ is used equivalently for Russia Variable codings 
and a further discussion are provided in the appendix. The dependent variable ‘Support for EU 
membership’ is scaled 1 = Approve, 2 = Neither, and 3 = Disapprove’. In all three cases ‘Disapprove’ 
is used as the reference category. To save space the results for ‘Neither’ are not reported, but may be 
obtained from the authors on request. Gender and city residence are scaled 1 = presence of the 
characteristic, 2 = otherwise. Age is scored 1 = over 60, 2 = 30–59 years old, 3 = under 30. Education 
is scored from 1 = higher to 3 = primary. Self-assessed income is scaled from 1 = high to 3 = low. The 
region variable is coded 1 = European and 2 = Asian in the case of Russia; 1 = West, 2 = Centre and 3 
= East in the case of Belarus; and 1 = West, 2 = South, 3 = Left Bank, 4 = Right Bank and 5 = East in 
the case of Ukraine (we base these distinctions on Birch, 2000, p. 4). Knowledge of the EU is scored 
from 1 = both answers correct to 3 = none (for question wordings see Table 5). Finally, European self-
identity takes values 1 = feel European, 2 = neither, 3 = don’t feel European. The high-ranking value 
within each scale for each variable is set at 0 when the regression analysis is performed, and therefore 
is not reported in Table 7. 
 
The explanatory power of all three models was satisfactory, with our predictors, 
taken together, explaining from a quarter to a third of the variation in the dependent 
variable. In all three countries socioeconomic characteristics, apart from age and 
geographical location, were weak predictors of support for EU membership, with 
inconsistent effects that varied across the three countries. For instance, in all three 
countries being male was likely to be associated with opposition to membership, other 
things being equal, but only in Russia was it statistically significant. And as in our 
cross-tabulations, males were not only more likely to oppose EU membership, they 
were also more likely to support it; the difference was that those who opposed EU 
membership were more numerous than those who supported it – in Russia, for 
instance, males were 56 per cent of those who opposed membership, but 48 per cent 
of those who supported it. There was a similar effect for higher education in the case 
of Belarus; the negative sign of the coefficient for higher education in relation to 
support for EU membership indicates that levels of opposition were higher than levels 
of support among better-educated people. Only in Russia did the impact of education 
on the levels of support appear to be statistically significant, with a higher education 
likely to raise levels of support independently of other factors. 
 We sought to isolate the additional effects of region in this final stage of the 
analysis, on the assumption that a geographical closeness to the West would be likely 
of itself to increase levels of support for EU membership even after socioeconomic 
circumstances had been included in the model. Our assumptions were broadly 
confirmed: left-bank and still more so western Ukraine were significantly more likely 
to favour EU membership, other factors have been controlled for, but so too were the 
central and western regions of Belarus; in Russia it made little difference if our 
respondents lived in the European rather than the Asian part of the country. But taken 
as a whole, what is most striking is the limited explanatory power of all of these 
socioeconomic variables as compared with (for instance) ‘feeling European’ – a 
finding that is compatible with the literature on voting behaviour in these countries, 
which has generally concluded that the socioeconomic determinants that are dominant 
in Western countries are less important than political beliefs and attitudes (see for 
instance White et al., 1997, pp. 41–67). 
 
Conclusion 
 
It may be appropriate in conclusion to reiterate the limitations of this study. We have 
dealt with the three Slavic republics that were formerly part of the USSR and which 
among them account for three-quarters of the area and half the population of what was 
formerly communist-ruled Europe. But our conclusions should not be assumed to 
apply to the postcommunist world as a whole, indeed they were not always consistent 
across these three countries. Still less do we wish to suggest that the factors we 
identify are the starting-point in a causal sequence that has its only possible outcome 
in support for EU membership. ‘Europe’ is a social construct, defined as much in 
contradistinction to a ‘non-Europe’ as in more positive ways (see Neumann, 1999; 
van Ham, 2001; Splidsboel-Hansen, 2002), and we take identity to represent the 
outcome of this continuous negotiation of shared meaning not just by national 
populations but by subgroups and individuals within them. In this sense identities and 
attitudes towards the EU in particular are likely to reflect perceptions in the region of 
the posture of the EU and its member countries towards their wider ‘neighbourhood’ 
and whether the relationship is seen as ‘inclusive’ or ‘exclusive’: as a relationship in 
which much is shared (if not membership), or as a ‘new dividing line’ that takes on 
some of the significance of the East–West divisions of the cold war. 
 Issues of this kind, in turn, may not always be most fruitfully examined by a 
methodology that draws too heavily on the data that are generated by the EU itself, 
most obviously the Eurobarometer. Obviously, all such exercises raise issues of a 
kind that are familiar within crossnational survey research. But exercises that are 
conducted for the European Commission in order to extend its knowledge of the 
European Union are likely to deal with a restricted range of questions and to cover no 
more than the present membership of the Union together with the countries that are 
likely to join in the near future (they may also incorporate the unstated assumptions of 
the sponsoring organization, as Baycroft (2004, p. 154) has noted). The Central and 
Eastern Eurobarometer, which included the entire territory of the Russian Federation, 
was not extended beyond 1997. At the same time, the exercises that have been 
conducted on a pan-European basis – such as the European Social Survey – have not 
generally extended their scope to the post-Soviet republics, and have tended to over-
represent the richer and more developed countries that can more readily sustain the 
costs of taking part.2 We hope to have indicated another way forward, which is to 
focus on a group of countries that lie within geographical Europe but outside the 
scope of the barometer exercises that presently exist, while using question wordings 
that maximize a broader comparability.  
 Within this context, perhaps the central conclusion of this study is fluidity. 
There are broadly positive attitudes towards the EU and its member countries in 
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, but also large elements of uncertainty. More than this, 
there are large elements of ignorance, compared not just with the existing EU Member 
States but also with a country such as Turkey, which is scarcely European in a 
geographical sense but which has been nominally seeking membership since 1963 and 
 
2 The European Social Survey, available at: «http://ess.nsd.uib.no», included no former Soviet republic 
in its first round but did include Estonia and Ukraine in its second round, conducted in 2004. 
Slomczynski and Tomescu-Dubrow identify three clusters, ranging from ‘high participation in cross-
national surveys’ in the cases of the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, to ‘low 
participation’ in the cases of Albania, Moldova, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Croatia (2006, pp. 49–
51). 
which has many of its citizens living and working in Germany and other parts of the 
continent. In these circumstances, the factors that shape support for membership are 
more likely to be attitudinal than social and economic; how could it be otherwise in a 
society in which forms of ownership have been changing rapidly and other certainties 
have been disappearing, in relation to a hypothetical development that has so far 
generated no winners or losers? ‘Men make their own history’, as Marx observes in 
the 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (1852), ‘but they do not make it just as they 
choose’. A new relationship between the two halves of ‘Europe’ will obviously reflect 
the socioeconomic environment in which both sides are located. But it will also reflect 
the negotiation of meaning between them in the ways we have examined in this 
article. This leaves a great deal of room for choices to be made by elites and publics 
across Member States and Slavic non-members about the different ways in which 
their relationship may be conceived. 
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Appendix 
 
Our surveys were conducted by Russian Research in association with the project on 
‘Inclusion without Membership? Bringing Russia, Ukraine and Belarus closer to 
“Europe” ’, which is funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council. In 
Russia, fieldwork took place between 21 December 2003 and 16 January 2004 and 
again between 23 March and 20 April 2005. The number of respondents in each case 
was 2000, selected according to the agency’s normal sampling procedures; it was 
representative of the population aged 18 and over, using a multistage proportional 
method with a random route method of selecting households. Interviews were 
conducted face to face in respondents’ homes. The sample was then weighted in 
accordance with sex, age and education in each region. In both cases there were 97 
sampling points and 150 interviewers were employed; the agency’s standard 
procedures were employed to check the completion of questionnaires and the logical 
consistency of the data. 
 In Belarus, our survey was conducted under the auspices of the same agency 
between 27 March and 18 April 2004. The number of respondents was 1597, selected 
according to the agency’s normal sampling procedures; it was representative of the 
population aged 18 and over, using a multistage proportional representation method 
with a random route method of selecting households. Interviews were conducted face 
to face in respondents’ homes. The sample was then weighted in accordance with sex 
and age in each region, using the 1999 census adjusted on the basis of expert 
estimates as of the start of 2003. There were 288 sampling points and 120 
interviewers were employed; 10 per cent of the interviews were randomly selected for 
checking. Our 2006 survey was conducted on a similar basis by the Centre for 
Sociological and Political Research of the Belarusian State University between 5 and 
19 June 2006, n = 1000.  
In Ukraine, our survey was conducted under the auspices of Russian Research 
between 23 March and 2 April 2004. The number of respondents was 2000, selected 
according to the agency’s normal sampling procedures; it was representative of the 
population aged 18 and over, using a multilevel, stratified method with a random 
method of selection at the final stage. Interviews were conducted face to face in 
respondents’ homes. The sample was then weighted in accordance with sex and age in 
each region. There were 259 sampling points and 187 interviewers were employed; 10 
per cent of the interviews were randomly selected for checking. Our 2006 survey was 
conducted by the same agency on similar principles between 24 April and 12 May 
2006, n = 1600. 
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